Une approche de la théorie institutionnelle à la réglementation de l'audit légale et statutaire by Baker, C. Richard et al.
Une approche de la the´orie institutionnelle a` la
re´glementation de l’audit le´gale et statutaire
C. Richard Baker, Jean Be´dard, Christian Prat Dit Hauret
To cite this version:
C. Richard Baker, Jean Be´dard, Christian Prat Dit Hauret. Une approche de la the´orie in-
stitutionnelle a` la re´glementation de l’audit le´gale et statutaire. LA COMPTABILITE, LE
CONTROˆLE ET L’AUDIT ENTRE CHANGEMENT ET STABILITE, May 2008, France.
pp.CD Rom, 2008. <halshs-00522319>
HAL Id: halshs-00522319
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00522319
Submitted on 30 Sep 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Une approche de la théorie institutionnelle à la 
réglementation de l'audit légale et statutaire  
 
C. Richard Baker, School of Business, Adelphi University, Garden City, NY 11530, Tél (516) 877-4628, E-mail: 
Baker3@Adelphi.edu 
 Jean Bédard, Faculty of Administration, University of Laval, Québec, Québec G1K 7P4, Canada, Tél: (418) 656-
7055, E-mail: jean.bedard@ctb.ulaval.ca 
Christian Prat dit Hauret, Bordeaux Montesquieu University, 35 Avenue Abadie, 33 100 Bordeaux, France, E-
mail : prat@u-bordeaux4.fr 
 
Résumé : En tant que cadre d'analyse, la théorie institutionnelle a été utilisée pour expliquer les différentes manières 
que les organisations développent et évoluent à travers le temps, en réponse à différents types de pressions 
institutionnelles. Cet article contribue à la littérature de la théorie institutionnelle de plusieurs façons. Tout d'abord, 
l'objet de l'étude est sur les récents changements dans les structures de régulation de l’audit légale et statutaire, une 
fonction importante dans le capitalisme contemporain. Deuxièmement, nous étendons la théorie institutionnelle par 
le biais d'une analyse comparative internationale des changements dans les structures de réglementation de l’audit 
légale et statutaire aux Etats-Unis, la France et le Canada. Troisièmement, d'une manière analogue à Dillard et al. 
(2004), nous étendons la théorie institutionnelle à travers une plus grande focalisation sur les aspects politiques de 
changement institutionnel en ce qui concerne la réglementation de l'audit légale et statutaire. Notre constat est qu'il y 
a eu des changements significatifs dans les structures de réglementation de l’audit légale et statutaire au cours des 
dernières années, entraînant une augmentation des niveaux d'isomorphisme institutionnel. Pressions, surtout à 
l'extérieur de cadres réglementaires nationaux, ont abouti à un plus grand légalisme dans la régulation de l’audit 
légale et statutaire dans les trois pays étudiés. La mondialisation des marchés de capitaux internationaux explique en 
partie ce phénomène, mais l'isomorphisme coercitif et isomorphisme mimétique sont également considérés comme 
jouant un rôle important dans ce processus. 
Mot clés:  Audit légale et statutaire, réglementation, la théorie institutionelle 
An Institutional Theory Approach to the Regulation of Statutory Auditing 
Abstract: As a framework of analysis, Institutional Theory has been used to explain the various ways that 
organizations develop and change through time in response to various kinds of institutional pressure.  This paper 
contributes to the Institutional Theory literature in several ways.  First, the focus of the paper is on recent changes in 
the regulatory structures for “statutory auditing”, an important function in contemporary capitalism.  Second, we 
extend Institutional Theory through an international comparative analysis of changes in the regulatory structures for 
statutory auditing in the United States, France and Canada.  Third, in a manner similar to Dillard et al. (2004), we 
extend Institutional Theory through an increased focus on the political aspects of institutional change with regard to 
the regulation of statutory auditing.  Our overall finding is that there has been significant change in the regulatory 
structures for statutory auditing in recent years, resulting in increased levels of institutional isomorphism.  Pressures, 
primarily external to the domestic regulatory frameworks, have resulted in greater legalism in the regulation of 
statutory auditing in the three countries examined.  Globalization of international capital markets partly explains this 
phenomenon, but coercive isomorphism and mimetic isomorphism are also seen as playing important roles in this 
process. 
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Introduction 
Statutory auditing is defined as the external audit of company financial statements by a 
person or persons recognized by the authority of the state as being competent to carry out such 
audits.  Statutory audits are mandated by law in most advanced capitalist countries, with a 
particular emphasis on companies issuing securities in public capital markets.  Statutory auditing 
is regulated by various entities, including institutions of the state as well as the organized 
accounting profession.  While the expressed purpose of the regulation of statutory auditing is  
protecting the public interest, the ways in which this purpose has been envisioned and activated 
have varied from country to country, ranging from Associationism in the British and Canadian 
contexts, to Legalism in France and Germany (see Putxy et al., 1987; Baker et al., 2001; Bédard 
et al, 2002).  
In this paper we examine recent changes in the regulation of statutory auditing in three 
countries with differing economic and legal traditions (i.e. the United States, France and 
Canada).  Business scandals and audit failures have prompted changes in the regulation of 
statutory auditing in these three countries, resulting in a greater degree of institutional 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1991).  Through the end of the 1990s, the 
United States, France and Canada had relatively distinct regulatory structures for statutory 
auditing (Puxty et al., 1987; Baker et al. 2002).  During the first years of the 21st century, 
pressures, primarily external to the domestic regulatory frameworks, resulted in increasing levels 
of Legalism in the regulatory structures of the three countries examined.  Globalization of 
international capital markets partly explains this phenomenon, but coercive and mimetic 
isomorphism also plays an important role. 
This paper contributes to Institutional Theory in accounting research in several ways.  
First, the focus of the paper is on recent changes in the regulatory structure of statutory auditing, 
which comprises an important aspect of the public accounting profession.  Second, we seek to 
extend Institutional Theory through an international comparison of changes in the regulatory 
structures for statutory auditing in three capitalist countries with differing economic and political 
histories. Third, in a manner similar to Dillard et al. (2004), we seek to extend Institutional 
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Theory through a focus on the political nature of institutional and organizational change, 
particularly with regard to the regulation of statutory auditing.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the first section we describe an 
analytical framework adapted from Puxty et al. (1987) which classifies modes of regulation in 
advanced capitalism.  In the second section, a summary of Institutional Theory as applied to the 
regulation of statutory auditing is addressed. In the third section, changes in the regulatory 
structures for statutory auditing in the United States, France and Canada are discussed.  A final 
section concludes the paper and offers some suggestions for further research. 
Modes of regulation 
In this section we briefly summarize an analytical framework developed by Puxty et al. 
(1987) which theorizes the regulation of accounting as the expression of the combined forces of 
the state, the social community, and the market.  Puxty et al. identified four modes of regulation 
under advanced capitalism: Liberalism, Associationism, Corporatism and Legalism.  These 
modes of regulation are distinguished by the relative degree of involvement of the state and the 
market in the regulatory structures.  As illustrated in Figure l, the modes of regulation can be 
arranged according to the increasing (decreasing) role of the state (market).    
***Insert Figure 1 here*** 
Liberalism -- Under Liberalism, the regulation of statutory auditing is defined by the market for 
audit services.  Auditing is viewed as a service purchased by companies in order to enhance the 
credibility of their financial statements.  Fees paid to the auditor are a function of the perceived 
value to the company of the credibility added by the audit.  The greater the credibility added, the 
greater the fee earned.  Fees may increase over time and thereby provide an on-going revenue 
stream for the auditor.  The auditor is self-interested and wants to build a reputation for quality 
and avoid the loss that might occur if the financial statements were revealed to be false or 
misleading.  Market forces exert pressures on auditors to maintain high levels of technical and 
ethical standards, to which they conform on a voluntary basis, and with respect to which they 
assume unlimited liability (Thornton, 1992). 
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Associationism.  At an intermediate level of regulation, falling between the market and the state, 
we find Associationism.  Pursuant to this mode of regulation, regulatory activities are effectuated 
through professional institutes or associations that represent and defend the interests of their 
members.  Membership in a professional institute or association is based on shared economic 
interests rather than consonance of values (Puxty et al., 1987, p. 284).  The coming together of 
individuals with similar economic and professional interests permits economies of scale to be 
realized with regard to entry level examinations and continuing professional education, as well as 
the creation and promulgation of professional standards.  It also permits association members to 
make their qualifications known to potential clients.  The association as a whole has an interest 
in building a reputation for honesty and integrity, so that membership in the association becomes 
a mark of quality.  To accomplish this objective, the association establishes stringent admission 
criteria, promulgates technical and ethical standards, oversees the practices of members, and 
when standards are violated, excludes delinquent members from membership or exacts penalties 
to deter such behavior.  Professional associations are frequently designated by the state as having 
certain rights or privileges pertaining to specific types of services (e.g. statutory auditing).   
Corporatism.  Under Corporatism, the state not only permits the creation of professional 
associations, it integrates these associations into its regulatory apparatus.  In essence, the state 
co-opts associations to implement its policies and procedures.  Corporatism permits the state to 
transfer the costs of regulating professional activities to the association while removing conflicts 
regarding monopoly practices from the sphere of public debate (Richardson and McConomy 
1992, p. 39).  In exchange, the association accepts constraints while agreeing to maintain 
professional standards.  The members of the association seek to enhance the reputation of the 
association because they recognize that their private interests must correlate with the public 
interest if the association is to maintain its favorable economic status (DTI, 1998, p. 4). 
Legalism.  Under Legalism, regulatory power resides with the state, and the exercise of 
regulatory power functions according to laws and regulations promulgated by the state.  
Legalism is commonly found when market mechanisms fail to deter private interests from 
transferring economic costs to others against their will (e.g. financial fraud), or if there is a need 
to establish a balance of power between private parties due to an asymmetry of information and 
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an inability on the part of one party to compel the other party to provide desired information.   
Under Legalism, professional associations function as an arm of the state. 
According to Puxty et al., Liberalism and Legalism are situated at opposite ends of a 
continuum passing through Associationism and Corporatism.  Empirically, one does not 
encounter pure instances of Liberalism or Legalism; these are ideal types.  Increasing levels of 
globalization and international economic integration have caused the regulatory distinctions 
proposed by Puxty et al. to become blurred.  Nevertheless, Puxty et al. maintained that certain 
modes of regulation tend to predominate in particular countries and that these modes of 
regulation differ from one country to another.  Thus, in Germany the mode of regulation is 
closest to Legalism, while in Sweden it closest to Corporatism.  In the United Kingdom the mode 
of regulation is closest to Associationism, and in the United States there has been an unusual 
mixture of Associationism and Legalism.  The dominant mode of regulation in a particular 
country is a function of various influences including: the power and prestige of the organized 
accounting profession; the economic and cultural history of the country; and the degree of 
control of corporations and business activity generally. 
Institutional theory1
Institutional Theory has been used to explain the ways that institutions and organizations 
develop and change through time.  Various aspects of institutional theory have provided a 
theoretical basis for research in diverse areas of accounting, including: the accounting profession 
(Carpenter and Dirsmith, 1993; Dirsmith et al, 1997; Eden et al, 2001; Fogarty, 1992a, b, 1996; 
Fogarty et al. 1997; Hunt and Hogler, 1993), accounting regulation (Hines et al. 2001); and the 
regulatory role of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Bealing, 1994; Bealing et al., 1996; 
Neu, 1991; Rollins and Bremser, 1997).   
Institutional Theory provides a framework for researching organizations and the social 
and political factors that impact on the evolution of organizations through time.  One of the 
underlying premises of institutional theory is that organizations are subject to regulative 
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processes and that they operate under external and internal governance structures.  In addition, 
all organizations are socially constituted, and they are subject to institutional processes that 
define the structures that organizations can assume and how they are able to operate legitimately 
(Dillard et al., 2004; Scott, 1995 p. 136). 
Institutionalization is a process whereby social practices in organizational settings are 
created and learned.  Institutional Theory is primarily concerned with an organization’s 
interactions with its environment, the effects of external expectations on the organization, and 
the effect of these expectations on organizational structures and practices (Martinez, 1999). 
Organizational activities are motivated by legitimacy-seeking behaviors, which are in turn 
influenced by socially constructed norms.  For organizations to survive, they must interact with 
their environment in ways that are acceptable to various constituents within the environment. By 
creating a formal structure that adheres to the norms and behavioral expectations of the 
environment, an organization demonstrates that it is acting on collectively valued purposes in an 
appropriate way (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  The incorporation of institutionalized elements 
provides the rationale for organizational activities and protects the organization from having its 
conduct questioned (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 349).  Thus, conscious efforts are made to 
create, maintain and manage legitimacy in the eyes of external groups in order to receive 
continued support (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and Zucker, 
1983). A highly institutionalized environment exerts pressures on organizations because of the 
power of external forces to influence the organization into adopting practices consistent with 
expectations (Greening and Gray, 1994, p. 471).   
Within Institutional Theory, the idea of isomorphism relates to the processes through 
which an organization adapts to the expectations of its external environment. These processes 
take place in a series of steps “occurring over a period of time and ranging from co-optation of 
the representatives of relevant environmental elements to the evolution of specialized boundary 
roles to deal with strategic contingencies” (Scott, 1991, p. 179).  Three types of isomorphism are 
mentioned within Institutional Theory: coercive, mimetic and normative (DiMaggio and Powell, 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 This summary of Institutional Theory relies on insights provided by Dillard et al. (2004). 
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1983).  Coercive isomorphism results from pressures exerted on an organization by external 
parties upon which the organization is dependent.  Mimetic isomorphism occurs when an 
organization seeks to imitate a more successful organization operating in the same environment.  
Normative isomorphism derives from the efforts of members of an organization to define the 
conditions and methods of organizational life. 
 The recent changes in the regulatory structures for statutory auditing in the United States, 
France and Canada, reflect the effects of coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism.  The 
changes in the regulatory structures are discussed in the following sections.  
The regulatory structures for statutory auditing 
This section analyses the changes made in the regulation of statutory auditing in the 
United States, France and Canada and discusses the impact of these changes on the regulatory 
structures used in these countries.  In each country, we examine three main aspects of regulation 
(licensing of auditors, standard setting, practice regulation) and the institutions involved in the 
regulatory structure. Because accounting scandals and reforms emerged first in the U.S., we 
begin our analysis with the regulation of statutory auditing in the United States. 
The United States 
After the emergence of the public accounting profession in the late 19th century, the 
regulatory structures for statutory auditing in the United States were defined in a formal terms by 
the individual states of the United States.  Each state has the power to issue a license to practice 
as a Certified Public Account (CPA), which is required to become a statutory auditor.  However, 
after the enactment of the federal securities laws in the 1930s, the regulation of securities trading 
became a matter of federal law.  Federal securities laws specify that financial statements of 
companies with securities traded in public capital markets must be audited by independent 
accountants (i.e. CPAs).  This requirement created the practice of statutory auditing in the United 
States.  Therefore, the regulation of statutory auditing in the United States involves institutions of 
both the federal and state governments.  In addition, the organized accounting profession, 
through the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA), has played an important role in the regulation 
of statutory auditing through its Auditing Standards Board (ASB), and through its Professional 
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Ethics Committee (PEC).  Coordinating with the state Boards of Accountancy, the AICPA also 
plays a central role in the disciplinary procedures of the accounting profession.  The AICPA also 
creates and marks the Uniform CPA exam, which is the only professional examination, required 
to become a statutory auditor in the United States. 
After the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, the regulatory structure for 
statutory auditing changed in significant ways.  The primary change was the creation of a federal 
regulatory body called the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) whose 
primary function is the regulation of “registered auditors” (i.e. statutory auditors).  Effectively, 
the responsibility for establishing auditing standards, independence standards, and practice 
reviews for statutory auditors was removed from the public accounting profession and 
transferred to the PCAOB.  The roles and responsibilities of these institutions are summarized 
below. 
**** Insert Figure 2 **** 
• Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) – The SEC is an agency of the US federal 
government, created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).  The stated 
mission of the SEC is to protect investors and maintain integrity in the financial markets.  
The SEC is charged with administering the federal securities laws. The powers of the 
SEC are considerable; it can establish both accounting and auditing standards as well as 
the qualifications of auditors (Securities Act of 1933). The SEC traditionally has 
delegated much of its responsibility for setting auditing standards to the accounting 
profession, retaining a role largely of oversight. In addition, it can institute legal 
proceedings against auditors.  
• Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB is a private-
sector, not-for-profit corporation, created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), a 
federal law enacted after the accounting scandals in 2001-2002.  The mandate of the 
PCAOB is to “oversee auditors of public companies in order to protect the interests of 
investors and to further the public interest in the preparation of informative, fair, and 
independent audit reports” (PCAOB, 2003).  The PCAOB began operations in April 
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2003.  The PCAOB includes five members chosen by the SEC in consultation with 
interested parties.  The majority of the five members must come from outside of the 
accounting profession.  All accounting firms that audit public companies in the United 
States, whether they are domestic or foreign, must register with the PCAOB.  The 
registration process involves paying a fee and agreeing to permit the audit practices of the 
registered firm to be inspected by the PCAOB on an annual basis.  The PCAOB has 
assumed the responsibility for establishing auditing standards, independence standards, 
and practice reviews.  The regulatory practices of the PCAOB are still evolving.  A 
number of issues remain unresolved, such as the role of the former Auditing Standards 
Board in establishing auditing standards.  
• State Regulation- The regulation of the accounting and auditing profession is carried out 
at the state level through Boards of Accountancy (Boards).  These Boards are 
governmental entities.  They administer laws dealing with the practice of accounting and 
auditing.  The Boards are responsible for issuing licenses to practice as a CPA.  The 
stated purpose of the laws is to protect the public interest.  The members of the state 
boards of accountancy are chosen by the governors of each state.  The powers of the 
Boards include the admission of persons who wish to become CPAs and the exercise of 
certain disciplinary powers (e.g. removal of license to practice).  In the state of New 
York, the members of the Board for Public Accountancy are selected by the Board of 
Regents of the State of New York, which is a governmental body created to supervise 
post-secondary education in that state.  The New York Board includes 20 licensed CPAs 
and two representatives from the general public. The financing of the Board comes from 
fees paid by licensed CPAs. 
• AICPA- CPAs are organized nationally into the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA).  Membership in the AICPA is voluntary.  In the past, the AICPA 
had a great deal of power and influence over the regulation of both accounting and 
auditing.  This power and influence has diminished.  Among the current activities of the 
AICPA are the preparation and marking of the Uniform CPA Exam, which is a necessary 
pre-requisite to becoming a CPA, and facilitating the activities of the Professional Ethics 
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Executive Committee, which sets the ethical standards for CPAs.  In addition, a great deal 
of Continuing Profession Education is conducted through the AICPA.  Until recently, the 
AICPA was also responsible for the issuance of Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(GAAS), which are the standards that auditors much follow when conducting audits. This 
responsibility has now been assumed by the PCAOB. 
 Auditing Standards Board (ASB) – The ASB was formed in 1978.  Until recently, the 
ASB had the responsibility of establishing Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(GAAS).  The ASB is composed of fifteen members.  Each of the major accounting 
firms has a representative on the ASB. Other members come from smaller practice 
units.  In addition, there has usually been one university professor.  The operations of 
the ASB are financed through the general budget of the AICPA.   With respect to 
audits of companies with publicly traded securities, the PCAOB has taken over the 
standards setting responsibilities of the ASB. The ASB continues to establish 
standards for other types of auditing and attestation services.  
 Ethics Division – The Ethics Division of the AICPA is responsible for administering 
and enforcing the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct.  The Ethics Division 
operates under the supervision of the Professional Ethics Executive Committee 
(PEEC).  The PEEC has 21 members.  Since October 2001, 25% of the members 
must represent the public. 
 Public Oversight Board- The U.S. accounting profession formerly had a self-
regulatory system under the AICPA for many years. The activities of self-regulation 
included coordinating state regulatory statutes, establishing and enforcing auditing 
and ethics standards and organizing the mandatory peer review process. 
Licensing of Auditors. State Boards of Accountancy are responsible for issuing license 
to practice as a Certified Public Account (CPA), which is a necessary requirement to become a 
statutory auditor. While the Boards of Accountancy of accountancy possess this power, in 
practice the profession has the main responsibility because it is the AICPA that creates and 
marks the Uniform CPA exam, which is the only professional examination required to become a 
statutory auditor in the United States.  
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 does not affect the licensing of individual auditors, but 
requires that all public accounting firms, domestic and foreign, register with the PCAOB (SOX, 
Sections 102 and 106a). Before SOX, all AICPA member firms that audited SEC registrants had 
to be member of the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the AICPA Division for CPA firms. Thus, 
following SOX, the regulatory mode for the licensing of audit firms has moved from 
associationism to legalism. 
Standards Setting. Before SOX, the AICPA was responsible to establish the auditing 
standards and ethical standards of auditors of both public and private companies. The Auditing 
Standards Board (ASB), which is composed of representative form the accounting firms and 
financed through the general budget of the AICPA, had the responsibility of establishing 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS). The Ethics Division of the AICPA had the 
responsibility of for administering the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct. Ethical – 
Independence (SEC had some rules) 
Practice Regulation:  Practice regulation of statutory auditors is now performed by 
PCAOB.  The PCAOB is a quasi-governmental entity, which operates under the aegis of the 
SEC, but with independent funding provided through fees charged to corporations that issue 
securities pursuant to the federal securities laws (SEC issuers).  Section 102 of SOX requires all 
accounting firms that audit SEC issuers to register with the PCAOB.  The larger accounting 
firms (those with more than 100 audit clients) must have their audit practices inspected annually 
by the PCAOB.  The PCAOB has the authority to censure, fine or suspend an accounting firm 
that violates its standards, rules or regulations.  The PCAOB also has the power to issue auditing 
standards, quality control standards, independence standards and ethics standards for registered 
accounting firms. Essentially, SOX removed self-regulation from the American public 
accounting profession (Siminuc, 2005; Defond and Francis, 2005; Kinney, 2005).  In addition, 
through a provision that has been controversial because of its extra-territorial nature, Section 106 
of SOX requires foreign accounting firm that audit SEC issuers or a subsidiary of an SEC issuer 
to register with the SEC.   This requires a double form of registration (i.e. PCAOB and a foreign 
regulatory body); however, a compromise was agreed to by the SEC and the PCAOB which 
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allows a foreign regulatory body to control inspection and enforcement issues if the PCAOB 
believes that the regulatory agency’s policies are effective. 
 Title II of SOX addresses auditor independence by prohibiting certain types of non-audit 
services if provided to audit clients (e.g. bookkeeping; information systems design and 
implementation; actuarial services; appraisal or valuation; internal audit; human resources; 
investment banking; legal services)(section 201).  Title II also requires mandatory audit partner 
rotation (section 203); mandatory audit reports to audit committees (section 204); and it prohibits 
auditors from being hired as financial officers of the audit client for a period of one year (section 
206).  
Discussion. Prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the regulatory structure for 
statutory auditing in the United States was described as a combination of Associationism and 
Legalism.  The evidence for Associationism was present in the key roles played by the AICPA in 
several areas of regulation including: creating and marking the nationwide CPA examination; 
determining and issuing Auditing Standards through the Auditing Standards Board; control of 
practice reviews through the Pubic Oversight Board (a private sector body created by the AICPA 
during the 1990s which was dissolved after the creation of the PCAOB); and control of ethics 
and disciplinary procedures through the Code of Conduct and the Joint Trial Board.  After the 
creation of the PCAOB, these regulatory powers were removed from the AICPA and transferred 
to the PCAOB.  Because the PCAOB is an organization created by law, the regulatory structure 
for statutory auditing in the United States can now be viewed as being closer to Legalism than 
Associationsim.  The way in which the institutional regulatory structure came to be modified in 
the United States was the result of a process of coercive isomorphism, involving entities external 
to the accounting profession (i.e. the Congress) which exerted its power to change the long 
established institutional regulatory structure.   
Frequently, when an institutional regulatory environment changes, there is an attempt by 
an organization operating within that environment to co-opt the external force in order to retain 
its own power.  The process of coercive isomorphism evident as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, has not yet led to apparent moves to re-acquire the lost regulatory power.  This may because 
the organized public accounting profession has benefited economically from the passage of the 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Since the passage of the act, statutory auditors in the U.S. have earned 
substantially higher fees than before to the act.  This is because, certain portions of the act 
required greater levels of auditing in order to test management’s assertions regarding the 
effectiveness of a company’s internal control system.  Thus, while the institutional regulatory 
structure evolved towards Legalism as a result of coercive isomorphism, statutory auditors were 
compensated for this lost of self-regulation through increased audit revenues.      
France 
 While audits of company financial statements existed before 1860, the origin of statutory 
auditing in France was the Loi du 23 Mai 1863, which created the limited liability companies 
called Sociétés à Responsabilité Limitée (SARL). The 1863 law and the subsequent Loi du 24 
juillet 1867 regarding Sociétés Anonymes (SA) required the owners of a SARL to appoint one or 
more commissaires with the responsibility to prepare a report on the financial situation of the 
company, its balance sheet and the accounts presented by the management.  
Another French law, the Décret de 1935, reiterated the Loi de 1867 requirement to 
designate a commissaire de société, but modified the requirement to restrict the choice to 
auditors chosen from a list maintained by the Appeal Court (an body of the French judicial 
system).  In order to be included on the list of statutory auditors, a person had to take a technical 
exam (Décret du 29 juin 1936).  Auditors included on the court list were also required to form an 
association, called the ‘Compagnie des commissaires agréés’, which possessed disciplinary 
power.  The Décret de 1935 also modified the Loi de 1867 to impose requirements regarding 
auditor independence and to establish criminal penalties for confirming false information. 
The Loi du 24 Juillet 1966, regarding business organizations, modernized the regulation 
of statutory auditing.  This law established the current legal framework for statutory auditing. 
“[I]ndependance was reinforced, entry to the profession was made conditional upon success in 
exams of a very high level and the purpose of the audit was defined” (Mikol 1993, p. 10). This 
law was supplemented by the Décret 69-810 du 12 Août 1969 specifying the obligations of 
statutory auditors and the organizational structure of the profession. In 2000, the Loi du 24 Juillet 
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1966 was integrated into the Code de Commerce (the basic French law dealing with business 
affairs). 
The Loi 2003-706 du 1er Août 2003 de Sécurité Financière, which modified the Code de 
commerce, was France’s response to the financial scandals in the United States and the passage 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Contrary to the situation in the US where the accounting profession 
essentially lost its self-regulatory status, the Loi de sécurité financière did not change the 
institutional regulatory structure for statutory auditing in France in significant ways. The new 
law retained the shared regulatory structure, whereby statutory auditors are regulated through an 
institutional legal framework which confers on them the status of a regulated profession and 
where auditors regulate themselves by defining ethics rules and establishing monitoring 
mechanisms.  The institutional changes in the regulation of statutory auditing in France have 
been focused around three main axes: creating an external controlling authority for the 
profession (the Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes), clarification and reinforcement of 
independence rules, and creation of new powers for the Garde des sceaux (Minister of Justice) 
and the securities commission (Autorité des marché financiers). Figure 3 shows the institutional 
regulatory structure for statutory auditing in France before and after the Loi 2003-706 du 1er 
août 2003 de Sécurité Financière. The new law added two new institutions: the Haut conseil du 
commissariat aux comptes (H3C) and the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) which replaced 
the Commission des Opérations de Bourse (COB). It also dissolved one organization, the Comité 
de déontologie de l'indépendance.  The members of the H3C and the AMF are named by the 
government of France (through the Minister of Justice). 
***Insert Figure 3*** 
Compagnies des Commissaires aux Comptes.2 Statutory auditors are organized at the 
regional level into Compagnies Régionales de Commissaires aux Comptes (CRCC) and at the 
                                                 
2  There is also an Ordre des Experts Comptables, whose members serve as advisors to companies regarding 
accounting and tax matters. Legally, the professions of Expert Comptable and Commissaire aux Comptes are 
distinct, but they are practiced simultaneously by many accountants in France, provided that the auditing 
function and the accounting advisory function are not carried out at the same time for the same client 
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national level into the Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes (CNCC). The 
CNCC, operates under the supervision of the Justice Minister (Garde des Sceaux).  The mission 
of the CNCC is to assure the proper functioning of auditing practice and to supervise and defend 
the profession and the independence of its members (Décret du 12 août 1969, art. 1). The CNCC 
is responsible for establishing requirements to become a statutory auditor; for establishing 
auditing standards; and for establishing the disciplinary practices of the profession. The CNCC is 
administered by a national council whose members are elected by representatives from the 
regional CRCCs. The regional representatives are chosen pursuant to a ratio of one 
representative per 200 members (Art. 51). Members of the CNCC include all statutory auditors, 
as well as auditing firms (Art. 25). The CNCC also establishes the ethical standards for the 
auditing profession. The operations of the CNCC are financed primarily through membership 
fees. The day to day operations of the profession are conducted through 34 regional companies 
of statutory auditors (CRCCs), the membership of which includes individual auditors as well as 
auditing firms. The regional CRCCs are managed by councils composed of between 6 and 26 
auditors elected by a secret ballot (Art. 30 and 31). The regional CRCCs are responsible for 
maintaining the list of members, supervising the practice of auditing, and determining the annual 
fees of members. The Loi de sécurité financière modified the status of the CNCC. It is now a 
public corporation with legal personality instituted under the aegis of the Minister of Justice and 
directed to serve the public interest (Loi 2003-706 du 1er août 2003, Art. 100). This status does 
not change its mission or structure, but as a public corporation, it has the power to defend the 
public interest by being a civil party against persons who commit infringements of rules or 
regulations. 
• Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes - The Loi de sécurité financière created 
the High Council for Auditors (H3C) to provide supervision for the profession with the 
support of the CNCC and to ensure respect for professional ethics and the independence 
of auditors (Code de commerce, Art. L821-1). The H3C  is composed of 12 members and 
includes legal experts and judges, persons qualified in the areas of economics and 
financial affairs, as well as representatives from the securities exchanges, along with 
certain academic accountants. Statutory auditors are included, but they constitute a 
minority of the members (3 members). The H3C is charged with reviewing and providing 
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an opinion on the auditing standards issued by the CNCC prior to their approval by the 
Minister of Justice. The H3C  has assumed the responsibility for audit quality reviews 
that was previously assumed by the Comité d’Examen National d’Activité (CENA). This 
program is directed towards the review of audit practices including: defining the scope of 
reviews; analysis of audit quality; conformity with ethical standards; and any other 
matters requested by the Minister of Justice in situations having public importance. The 
H3C also serves as an appeal board for disciplinary decisions of the regional CRCCs. The 
funds required to operate the H3C  are derived from the budget of the Ministry of Justice. 
• Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF). This entity was created by the Loi de sécurité 
financière du 1er août 2003, through a merger of the Commission des Opérations de 
Bourse (COB), the Conseil des Marchés Financiers (CMF), and the Conseil de discipline 
de la gestion financière (CDGF). The mission of the AMF includes overseeing the 
functioning of the securities markets. The CNCC operates in close collaboration with the 
AMF. The work of these bodies is coordinated to improve the quality of information 
provided by companies to markets and to improve the practice of statutory auditing. Like 
its predecessor, the AMF must be informed of proposals to appoint or reappoint the 
auditors of public companies and it may make a comment on such proposals. It may also 
request information about auditees from statutory auditors. The Loi de sécurité financière 
also gave power to the AMF to initiate an inspection of a statutory auditor to request the 
assistance of the CNCC. 
• Comité de déontologie de l'indépendance (CDI). In 1999, the Commission des 
Operations de Bourse (COB) and the CNCC established a consultative committee on 
independence, referred to by its French acronym as the CDI. The mission of the CDI was 
to provide advice and recommendations concerning the independence of statutory 
auditors, particularly with regard to auditors of companies with publicly traded securities, 
and also to enhance the objectivity of audit findings. The CDI was composed of 11 
persons designated jointly by the CNCC and the AMF, of which the majority cannot 
come from the auditing profession. Since 2003, the H3C  is the highest authority invested  
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with the duty of regulating statutory auditing, whether the auditee is a public company or 
not. 
  Discussion.  Since the passage of the first French law regulating statutory auditing, in 
1866, the institutional regulatory structure for statutory auditing can be seen as being closest to 
Corporatism.  The French government essentially created the profession of statutory auditor and 
mandated that all statutory auditors must belong to a professional organization created by the 
government, whose members would be designated by the French courts operating under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Justice.  At the same time, however, auditing standards, the code 
of ethics and disciplinary procedures were essentially left up to the statutory auditors themselves, 
operating through professional organizations (the CNCC and CRCCs).  The 2003 law did not 
change this institutional regulatory structure significantly except by merging and renaming 
certain bodies.  These changes were made in response to the processes of coercive isomorphism 
that existed in the United States as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  However, the French law 
can be seen as an example of mimetic isomorphism, in that the institutional structures created by 
the law were intended in part to mimic those of the United States.  The H3C is similar to the 
PCAOB in the United States. But, it should be noted that the basic operations of the CNCC and 
the CRCCs have not changed significantly under the new law, and the establishment of auditing, 
ethics and independence standards, as well as practice reviews and disciplinary procedures, 
remain largely under the purview of the statutory auditors themselves.  Thus, there has not been 
much change in the institutional regulatory structure for statutory auditors in France, even though 
the structural form of the institutions has changed in appearance in a way that mimics the 
changes that took place in the United States. 
Canada 
Pursuant to the Canadian constitution, the power to regulate professional activity as well 
as the initial issuance and trading of corporate securities, is within the responsibility of the 
Provinces.  In essence, the ten Provinces of Canada regulate the practice of statutory auditing, 
acting in collaboration with the self-regulated bodies that make up the provincial and national 
accounting profession.  Figure 4 outlines the relationships between the bodies involved in the 
regulation of statutory auditing in Canada.  
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***Insert Figure 4*** 
All of the Provincial governments, with the exception of Québec, have established 
regulatory bodies to regulate public accountancy and statutory auditing.  In Ontario, the Public 
Accountant Council (Council) is charged with the responsibility for administering the public 
accountancy laws and regulations (L.R.O. 1990, c. P-37).  The primary mission of the Council is 
to assure that persons practicing public accountancy possess a proper license issued by the 
Council.  In addition to issuing a license to practice public accountancy, the Council exercises 
certain disciplinary powers, and can initiate lawsuits against persons who violate the public 
accountancy laws.  The Council includes fifteen members, of whom twelve are named by the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario (ICAO), and three are elected from among persons 
who are licensed to practice public accountancy but who are not members of the ICAO3.  The 
operations of the Council are financed through annual fees paid by licensed professional 
accountants. 
In Québec, there is no specific regulator for the public accountancy profession.  By law, 
the regulatory responsibility has been delegated to the Order of Chartered Accountants of 
Québec (Order, or OCAQ).  This body, like all other professional bodies in Québec, is 
supervised by the Office of Professions (Office).  The function of the Office of Professions is to 
assure that professional bodies act in the public interest (L.R.Q., c. C-26, art. 12).  The powers 
exercised by the Office are significant.  It can make recommendations regarding rules and 
regulations of the Order, and if the Order does not adopt such recommendations, the Office can 
impose them.  The Office is composed of five members named by the Government of Québec.  
Four of the members, including the chairperson and the vice-chairperson, must be licensed 
professionals.  Three of the four, including either the chairperson or the vice-chairperson, are 
chosen from a list provided to the Government by the Inter-Professional Council.  The fifth 
member of the Office cannot be a licensed professional.  This member is chosen based on his or 
her ability to protect the public interest (L.R.Q., c. C-26, a. 4). The financing of the Council is 
                                                 
3  As of February 2001, only 47 (less than 1%) out of 8,184 licensed public accountants were not members of the  
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obtained from individual fees paid by licensed professionals.  The Government determines the 
fees, but the fees are collected by the professional bodies.  
In each Province, there is also a self-regulatory body of professional accountants. In 
Québec, the Order of Chartered Accountants was designated by law as the principal body 
responsible for the protecting the public interest with respect to public accountancy and statutory 
auditing.  Towards this end, the Order is required to supervise the practice of its members 
(L.R.Q., c. C-26, a. 23).  The functioning of the Order is prescribed by the Code of Professions 
and is overseen by the Office of Professions.  The Order is administered by a Board of Directors 
headed by a Chairperson.  The Board is composed of twenty-four directors elected by members 
of the Order in a secret ballot. The Board also includes four directors named by the Office of 
Professions, after consultation with various groups including labor unions, financial institutions, 
and educators (L.R.Q., c. C-26, a. 61 à 78). 
In the other provinces, there are also self-regulatory professional organizations that play a 
role in the regulation of statutory auditing in Canada.  For example, in Ontario,  the ICAO is a 
body established by the Chartered Accountants Act, 1956 (CA Act).  In order to become  a 
statutory auditor in Ontario, a person must be recognized as a Chartered Accountant (CA).  The 
CA Act specifies that the ICAO is the only professional body that can enroll CA’s, thereby 
creating a monopoly for CA’s regarding statutory auditing in Ontario.  Pursuant to the CA Act, 
the ICAO is responsible for, among other things, maintaining the knowledge and competence of 
its members, and promoting and protecting the interests of the accounting profession.  In contrast 
with the Order of Chartered Accounts of Québec, which must follow the regulations of the Code 
of Professions of Québec, the ICAO has greater freedom to function.  It can adopt regulations 
and have them approved by its members.  The ICAO is administered by a Council composed of 
sixteen CA’s elected by members of the institute, as well as four members named by Lieutenant-
Governor of Ontario4 (CA Act 1956, p. 5). 
                                                 
4  Beginning in 1990, and until the modification of the CA Act in 2000, the Council included two public 
representatives who had the right to participate in the affairs of the Council, but not vote. These members were 
chosen by the Council. 
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The members of the provincial institutes of Chartered Accountants are usually members 
of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA). The primary function of the CICA is 
to develop and issue accounting and auditing standards.  It also shares responsibilities with the 
provincial institutes where it is determined that these relate to the Canadian accounting 
profession as a whole, notably: strategic planning; the process of admitting new members; and 
administering the code of ethics.  The CICA is governed by a Board of Directors of twelve 
members, including two public representatives.  The operations of the CICA are financed 
through fees paid by members of the Provincial institutes.  
The CICA has several committees and boards that are important in the regulatory 
structure of the Canadian public accounting profession.  Among these are : 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board  (AASB)– The mission of the AASB5 is to 
assist the Canadian accounting profession in serving the public interest by enhancing the quality 
of auditing and assurance services.  The AASB supports the growth and relevance of auditing 
and assurance services by disseminating generally accepted standards and implementation 
guidance for a range of assurance and related services. These standards and guidance are 
assumed to reflect best practices and to meet the needs of auditors and users of financial 
statements. The AASB is interested in international harmonization and is working with the 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) and other standard setters 
towards that goal. The AASB comprises twelve persons, all members of the CICA, with a 
majority who are practicing public accountants, along with a minority representing other spheres 
of activity such as industry, commerce, finance and academia. The chair and vice-chair of the 
AASB are named by the Board of Directors of the CICA.  The other members are invited to 
serve by the Director of Auditing and Assurance Standards.  The operations of the AASB are 
financed by the CICA.  
Provincial Securities Commissions – Each Province has a Securities Commission which 
regulates, among other things, companies issuing securities (common shares and bonds) to the 
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public, including companies with shares are listed on stock exchanges.  For example, in Québec, 
the Québec Securities Commission (CVMQ) is an autonomous regulatory body charged with 
overseeing the operations of the securities markets in Québec.  The Commission exercises 
functions established by law to protect investors and regulate  information received by 
shareholders (L.R.Q., c. V-1.1., a. 276).  The Commission is composed of seven members, 
including a chairperson and two vice-chairs.  The members are named by the Québec 
government for a maximum period of five years (L.R.Q., c. V-1.1., a. 277). The operations of the 
Commission are financed through fees paid by the issuers of securities.  The provincial securities 
commissions act together with the Canadian Securities Authority to establish uniform rules and 
regulations throughout Canada.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
There are similarities in the institutional regulatory structures for statutory auditing in the 
United States, France and Canada (see Table 1).   In each of these countries, there are entities of 
the state involved in the institutional regulatory structures, along with involvement of the 
professional institutes.  The number of bodies, their powers, their responsibilities and constraints 
under which they operate, vary from country to country.  In addition, depending on the legal 
structure of the country, the number of entities and the degree of centralization of power varies.  
With regard to capital markets, each of the three countries has created a national, state or 
provincial regulatory body that is charged by law with the responsibility of protecting the 
interests of investors.  These entities are under the direct control of the state.  Typically the 
majority of the members of these bodies are named by the state; their powers and responsibilities 
are prescribed by law, and they must account directly to the state for their actions and their 
decisions.  
***Insert Table 1*** 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 The name of the Assurance Standards Board (formerly, Auditing Standards Board) was changed to the Auditing 
and Assurance Standards Board in September 2003. 
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In the United States, and in several Canadian provinces, the laws regarding the regulation 
of statutory auditing mandate the creation of governmental agencies (i.e. Boards of 
Accountancy) which are responsible for certain aspects of regulation.  In contrast with securities 
regulatory commissions, these entities are often controlled by professional accounting bodies.  In 
the province of Ontario, the members of the regulatory body are named by the Canadian Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (CICA).  
In France and in Canada, professional associations have also been created by law.  
Pursuant to the regulatory mode of Corporatism, the state has integrated these associations into 
its system of regulatory control by conferring certain responsibilities and powers on the 
associations, while also establishing certain constraints on their behavior. The degree of 
constraint varies.  In Québec and Ontario, public representation on the Board of Directors of the 
OCAQ and the ICAO is required, while in France only statutory auditors can serve on the 
administrative bodies of the CRCCs and CNCC.   Nevertheless, pursuant to the recent creation of 
the High Council for the CNCC, the majority of the members of the High Council must come 
from outside of the auditing profession.  Typically the members of the High Council are 
magistrates or representatives of the French government.  The constraints imposed on the 
regulatory bodies are perhaps greatest in Québec, where the powers of the OCAQ are stipulated 
by the Code of Professions.  In contrast, the ICAO in Ontario probably has the least amount of 
constraint imposed by law.  With the exception of mandated public representation on its Board of 
Directors, the CA Act of Ontario imposes few obligations and constraints on the ICAO.  The 
regional companies of Commissaires aux comptes in France have a number of constraints on 
their duties and their internal functioning, but they also enjoy a great deal of latitude regarding 
the means used to realize their objective of regulating statutory auditors.  
Finally, in the United States and in Canada, there are professional associations like the 
AICPA, the state societies of CPAs, and the CICA. Pursuant to the regulatory mode of 
Associationism, these bodies are self-regulated and function without specific legal constraints 
imposed by the state.  In the US, the AICPA and the state societies of CPAs provide an example 
of Associationism.  Not only are they self-regulated, but membership is voluntary.  Despite the 
absence of specific legal requirements, these associations often function in a manner similar to 
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professional associations created by law.  Thus, both the AICPA and the CICA have public 
representatives on their Board of Directors. 
 After passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States, the institutional regulation 
for statutory auditing in the United States underwent a process of coercive isomorphism in which 
the self-regulatory powers of the profession were removed and transferred to the PCAOB. The 
comparative evolution of the regulatory structures for auditing in the U.S., France and Canada is 
shown in Table 2. In France, a new law enacted in 2003, merged and renamed certain 
institutional regulatory structures for statutory auditing in a process of mimetic isomorphism, 
which mimicked the events taking place in the United States, but which did not change the 
fundamental institutional regulatory structures in France.  In Canada, there was a certain degree 
of mimetic isomorphism in response to the events in the United States, but the auditing 
profession in Canada was largely able to maintain self-regulation.  A sort of normative 
isomorphism was more evident in Canada.  As the globalization of capital markets continues, we 
may expect to see an increased level of institutional isomorphism in the regulatory structures for 
statutory auditing in advanced capitalist countries.  In this regard, it can be seen that the 
processes of globalization are causing a form of coercive isomorphism, which tends to obscure 
the formerly distinct categories of regulation existing in advanced capitalism as described by 
Puxty et al. (1987).  What this means for future regulation of statutory auditing in a globalized 
environment is still unclear.  While there appears to be a desired on the part of many national 
governments to increase the level of regulation of statutory auditing thus leading to an increased 
degree of Legalism, there is also a corresponding effort on the part of the organized public 
accounting profession to retain as much power over its own regulation as possible.  See Table 2 
for a graphic representation of the comparative evolution of regulation of statutory auditing as 
described above. 
***Insert Table 2***
 23
REFERENCES 
AICPA (2001a). Code of Professional Conduct. American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/index.htm). 
AICPA (2001b). Independence Rules. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/ethics/independence.htm). 
AICPA (2001c). SEC Practice Section. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/secps/index.htm). 
AICPA (2001d). Independence Standards Board to cease operations after making major 
contributions to the resolution of difficult and longstanding auditor independence issues, 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(http://www.aicpa.org/news/p071701.htm). 
AICPA (2001e). Tort Reform Issues In The Uniform Accountancy Act. American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (http://www.aicpa.org/states/uaa/tort.htm) 
AICPA/NASBA. (1999) Report On Proposed New AICPA/NASBA Joint Code Of Conduct, 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(http://www.nasba.org/nasbaweb.nsf/sit). 
Baker, C.R. (1993). Self-regulation in the public accounting profession: the response of the large, 
international public accounting firms to a changing environment. Accounting, Auditing, 
Accountability Journal, 6 (2), 68-80.  
Baker, C.R., Mikol, A. and Quick, R. (2001). Regulation of the statutory auditor in the European 
Union: A comparative survey of the United Kingdom, France and Germany. European 
Accounting Review, 10(4), 763-786. 
Barley, S.R. and Tolbert, P.S. (1997). Institutionalization and structuration: studying the links 
between action and institution. Organization Studies, 18, 93-117. 
Bealing, W.E. Jr (1994). Actions speak louder than words – an institutional perspective on the 
SEC. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 19, 555-67. 
Bealing, W.E. Jr, Dirsmith, M.W. and Fogarty, T.J. (1996). Early regulatory actions by the SEC: 
an institutional theory perspective on the dramaturgy of political exchanges. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 21, 317-39. 
Bédard, J. and Leblanc, L. (1991). Prévenir plutôt que guérir. CA Magazine (November) 40-45. 
Bédard, J. (2001). The disciplinary process of the accounting profession: protecting the public or 
the profession? The Québec experience. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 
20(4/5)(Winter) 399-437. 
Bédard, J., Gonthier-Besacier, N. and Richard, C. (2001). Quelques voies de recherche françaises 
en audit, in Teller, R. and Dumontier, P. Faire de la Recherche en Comptabilité 
Financièr, FNGE – Vuilbert.  
Bédard, J., Baker, C.R. and Prat dit Hauret, C. (2002). La réglementation de l'audit : Une comparaison 
entre le Canada, les États-Unis et la France. Comptabilité, Contrôle et Audit (Mai), 139-168. 
 24
Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. (1967), The Social Construction of Reality, Doubleday, New 
York, NY. 
Blij, I., Hassink, H., Mertens, G. and Quick, R. (1998). Disciplinary practices and auditors in 
Europe: A comparison between Germany and the Netherlands. The European Accounting 
Review, 7(3) 467-491. 
Carpenter, B. and Dirsmith, M.W. (1993). Sampling and the abstraction of knowledge in the 
auditing profession: an extended institutional theory perspective. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 18, 41-63. 
Code Civil Du Québec (1991). Lois du Québec. 
Code Des Professions (1994). Lois refondus du Québec c26.   
Commission de Reduction des Formalites Administratives de l'Ontario (2001). La Comptabilité 
Publique: Recommandations à l'Attention du Procureur Général, 
(http://www.redtape.gov.on.ca/french/member/default.asp?action=show&article_id=209) 
Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes (2000). Normes professionnelles et code 
de déontologie, Paris: CNCC Edition. 
Compagnie Nationale Des Commissaires Aux Comptes (1999). Guide, Juillet, Paris: CNCC 
Edition. 
Décret 69-810 Du 12 Août (1969). Paris: French Government. Defond, M. and Francis, J. 
(2005). Audit research after Sarbanes-Oxley. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 
24(Supplement), 5-30. 
Defond, M. and Francis, J. (2005). Audit research after Sarbanes-Oxley. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice and Theory, 24(Supplement), 5-30. 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)(1998). A Framework of Independent Regulation for the 
Accountancy Profession: A Consultation Document, http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/framework. 
DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W. (1991). Introduction, in Powell, W.W. and DiMaggio, P.J. 
(Eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, IL, pp. 1-38. 
Dillard, J., Rigsby, J.T., and Goodman, C. (2004). The making and remaking of organization 
context: Duality and the institutionalization process. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 17, 506-542. 
Dirsmith, M.W., Heian, J.B. and Covaleski, M.A. (1997). Structure and agency in an 
institutionalized setting: the application and social transformation of control in the big 
six. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 22, 1-27. 
Eden, L., Dacin, M.T. and Wan, W.P. (2001).  Standards across borders: cross border diffusion 
of the arms length standard in North America. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
26, 1-23. 
Evans, L. and Nobes, C. (1998). Harmonization relating to auditor independence: The Eighth 
Directive, the UK and Germany. The European Accounting Review, 7(3), 493-516. 
 25
Fogarty, T.J. (1992a). Organizational socialization in accounting firms – a theoretical framework 
and agenda for future research. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 17, 129-49.  
Fogarty, T.J. (1992b). Financial accounting standard setting as an institutionalized action field – 
constraints, opportunities and dilemmas. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 11, 
331-55. 
Fogarty, T.J. (1996). The imagery and reality of peer review in the US: insights from 
institutional theory. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 18, 243-67. 
Fogarty, T.J., Zucca, L.J., Meonske, N. and Kirch, D. (1997). Proactive practice review: a critical 
case study of accounting regulation that never was. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
8, 67-87. 
Goldwasser, D.L. (2001). The rise and fall of the ISB. CPA Journal, (October) 10-11.  
Institut Canadien Des Comptables Agréés (1988). Rapport de la commission sur les attentes du 
public (Rapport MacDonald). Toronto:  Insitut canadien des comptables agréés. 
Kinney, W. (2005). Twenty-Five Years of Audit Deregulation and Re-Regulation: What does it 
mean for 2005 and Beyond?  Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 24 
(Supplement), 89-109. 
Lee, T. (1995). The professionalization of accountancy:  A history of protecting the public 
interest in a self-interested way. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 8(4) 48-
69. 
Loi Du 24 Juillet (1966). Paris: French Government. 
Loi Sur La Comptabilite Publique (1990). Lois Refondus de l’Ontario (L.R.O.), c. P-37, 
(http://192.75.156.68/DBLaws/Statutes/French/90p37_f.htm). 
Mikol, A. and Standish, P. (1998). Audit independence and non-audit services: A comparative 
study in differing British and French perspectives. The European Accounting Review, 
7(3), 541-569. 
Mitchell, A., Puxty, T., Sikka, P. and Willmott, H. (1994). Ethical Statements as Smokescreens 
for Sectional Interests:  The Case of the UK Accountancy Profession. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 13, 39-51. 
Ordre Des Comptables Agrées Du Quebec (1994). Processus d'apprentissage permanent.  
Parker, L. (1994). Professional accounting body ethics: In search of the private interest, 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 19(6), 507-525. 
PCAOB (2003). Press Release. Washington, DC: Public Companies Accounting Oversight 
Board. 
Pitt, H.L. (2002). Regulation of the Accounting Profession. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Securities & 
Exchange Commission,  http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch535.htm. 
POB (2001). Public Oversight Board Annual Reports, New York: Public Oversight Board, 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
(http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/secps/pob/index.htm). 
 26
Projet De Loi No 87 (2000). Loi modifiant le Code des professions et d’autres dispositions 
législatives, chapitre 13.  Paris: French Government. 
Puxty, A.G., Willmott, H.C., Cooper, D.J., and Lowe, T. (1987). Modes of regulation in 
advanced capitalism: Locating accountancy in four countries. Accounting Organizations 
and Society, 12(3), 273-291.  
Richardson, A. and Mcconomy, B. (1992). Three Style of Rules. CA Magazine, 40-44. 
Robson, K., Willmott, H.C., Cooper, D.J. and Puxty, A.G. (1994). The ideology of professional 
regulation and the markets for accounting labour: Three episodes in the recent history of 
the UK accountancy profession. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 19(6), 527-553. 
SEC (1997). Policy Statement: The Establishment and Improvement of StandardsRelated to 
Auditor Independence, Financial Reporting Release No. 50.  Washington, D.C.: 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Washington, D.C.: Securities Exchange Commission. Siminuc, 
D. (2005). Discussion of Twenty-Five Years of Audit Deregulation and Re-Regulation: 
What does it mean for 2005 and Beyond?  Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 24 
(Supplement), 111-113. 
Siminuc, D. (2005). Discussion of Twenty-Five Years of Audit Deregulation and Re-Regulation: 
What does it mean for 2005 and Beyond?  Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 24 
(Supplement), 111-113. 
Streeck, W. and Schmitter, P.D. (1985). Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State, 
New York: Sage. 
Sunder, S. (1997). Theory of Accounting and Control. Cincinnati: South-Western College 
Publishing. 
The Chartered Accountants Act (1956). 4-5 Elizabeth II, Ch. 7 of the Statutes of Ontario, 
(http://www.icao.on.ca/public/handbook/ca_act.html. 
Thornton, D. (1992). L'intervention de l'état dans les marchés de l'expertise comptable – 
Réquisitoire. Finéco, 2(1) 1-8. 
 
 27
Figure 1,  Modes of regulation  
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Figure 2, Panel A, Regulatory Structure for Statutory Auditing in the United States Before 
Sarbanes Oxley 
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Figure 2, Panel B, Regulatory Structure in the United States after Sarbanes Oxley 
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Figure 3 Regulatory Structure of Auditing in France 
Before the Reform After the Reform 
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Figure 4  Regulatory Structure of Auditing in Canada 
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 Table 1 
Comparison of Regulation 
ASPECT OF 
REGULATION 
CANADA FRANCE UNITED STATES 
Licensing of Auditors  Corporatism/ 
Associationism 
Corporatism/Legalism Associationism/ 
Legalism 
Standards Setting    
• Auditing Associationism Corporatism/ 
Legalism 
Legalism 
• Ethical  Associationism 
(Ontario)  
Corporatism (Québec)
Corporatism/ 
Legalism 
Associationism/ 
Legalism 
 
Practice Regulation  
Associationism 
(Ontario) 
Corporatism (Québec)
Corporatism Legalism 
 
Preponderant Mode  
Associationism 
(Corporatism in 
Québec) 
Corporatism/ 
Legalism 
Associationism/ 
Legalism 
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Table 2 Evolution of Regulation 
ASPECT OF REGULATION 
M
ar
ke
t 
 A
ss
oc
ia
tio
ni
sm
 
 C
or
po
ra
tis
m
 
 Le
ga
lis
m
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA        
Licensing of Auditors        
  Individuals   B, A     
  Firms   B Î  A 
Standards Setting        
  Auditing   B  Î  A 
  Ethical   B  Î  A 
  Ethical - Independence       B, A 
Practice Regulation        
  Practice Inspection   B  Î  A 
  Enforcement    B Î A         
PREPONDERANT MODE    B  Î  A 
CANADA        
Licensing of Auditors        
  Individuals   B, A     
  Firms B  Î  A   
Standards Setting        
  Auditing   B, A     
  Ethical   B, A     
Practice Regulation        
  Practice Inspection   B Î A   
  Enforcement   B Î A           
PREPONDERANT MODE    B Î A   
FRANCE        
Licensing of Auditors        
  Individuals     B,A   
  Firms B,A       
Standards Setting        
  Auditing   B,A     
  Ethical   B,A     
  Ethical - Independence       B, A 
Practice Regulation        
  Practice Inspection     B,A   
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ASPECT OF REGULATION 
M
ar
ke
t 
 A
ss
oc
ia
tio
ni
sm
 
 C
or
po
ra
tis
m
 
 Le
ga
lis
m
 
  Enforcement     B  ,A           
PREPONDERANT MODE      B,A   
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